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North Carolina is among the states that subject tangible personal
property to ad valorem taxation.' By its nature, this species of property can
be moved about from place to place. This characteristic means that it is often
necessary to determine whether North Carolina has the power to subject
certain tangible personalty to taxation at all2 and, if so, which of the state's
numerous taxing jurisdictions has this power under the tax situs rules laid
down in the statutes.
3
It is especially difficult to determine the tax status of goods and
merchandise that are in North Carolina on tax day4 in the course of manufac-
ture, processing or shipment. This difficulty was amply illustrated by the
recent decision of the North Carolina Supreme Court in In re Hanes Dye &
Finishing Co. 5 There, the court held that the North Carolina statutes do not
purport to tax tangible personal property owned by a nonresident that is
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1. The ad valorem tax is a "tax on property. . . based or measured by the value of the
property as a marketable item." H. LEWIS, THE PROPERTY TAx IN NORTH CAROLINA I (Institute
of Government, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1975).
2. The State of North Carolina has not regularly levied a property tax for general state
purposes since 1921, but this tax remains the major source of revenue for local government. In
the 1975-1976 fiscal year, the total property tax levies of North Carolina counties, munici-
palities and special districts amounted to about $682 million. TAX RESEARCH DIvIsION, NORTH
CAROLINA DEP'T OF REVENUE, STATISTICS OF TAXATION 117 (1976). By contrast, the state
individual income tax collections for the same period were $604 million, id. at 39, and state
sales tax collections were $465 million, id. at 63.
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-304 (1972 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
4. With minor exceptions, the value, ownership and situs of taxable property is deter-
mined annually as of January 1. Id. § 105-285 (Cum. Supp. 1977). This date is known among tax
officials as "tax day."
5. 285 N.C. 598, 207 S.E.2d 729 (1974); see Ferrell & DeBaets, Recent Legal Devel-
opments of Interest to Property Tax Administrators, PROP. TAX BULL., No. 43, Mar. 3, 1975, at
1-5 (Institute of Government, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1975); Note,
Taxation-Personal Property Owned by Nonresidents: Taxable While at a North Carolina
Manufacturing Plant?, 53 N.C.L. REV. 1132 (1975); note 68 infra.
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brought into the state solely for manufacturing or processing leading toward
the production and sale outside the state of a finished, usable product. It is
possible to interpret the statute differently, however. This article will offer
an analytical framework for determining when North Carolina has the power
to tax goods and merchandise that have no "more or less permanent"
6
location in this state but that happen to be here on tax day.
The property tax base is defined by North Carolina General Statutes
section 105-274 as follows: "All property, real and personal, within the
jurisdiction of the State shall be subject to taxation unless it is (1) [e]xcluded
from the tax base by a statute of statewide application . . . or (2)
[e]xempted from taxation by the Constitution or by a statute of statewide
application . . . ."7 Thus, a county assessor ordinarily has jurisdiction8 to
tax any personal property he finds within his taxing jurisdiction on tax day
unless the owner can establish that it is specifically exempted or excluded
from taxation.
9
The key phrase in the statute is "within the jurisdiction of the State." 
10
Does this mean "more or less permanently located" in North Carolina, as
implied by the North Carolina Supreme Court in Hanes,n or does it have a
broader meaning? It appears that the General Assembly intended to exercise
the full power to tax property possessed by the State of North Carolina under
the state constitution and the United States Constitution.
It was once thought that the concept of jurisdiction to tax property was
bound up with the idea of domicile on the one hand and with the physical
presence of the property within the borders of the state on the other. 12 The
6. The quoted phrase was used by the North Carolina Supreme Court in In re Pilot
Freight Carriers, Inc., 263 N.C. 345, 351, 139 S.E.2d 633, 638 (1965), and was subsequently
adopted by the General Assembly to determine intrastate situs of personal property. See N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 105-304(b)(1) (1972); H. LEWIS, THE ANNOTATED MACHINERY ACT OF 1971, at 89
(Institute of Government, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1971).
7. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-274(a) (1972).
8. Jurisdictional analysis has frequently been complicated by a failure to recognize that
the basic concept takes on a different meaning in a variety of relatively distinct contexts.
"[Tihe word 'jurisdiction' covers a multitude of ideas. It is indeed a chameleonic word, a cloak
of many colors." A. EHRENZWEIG & D. LOUISELL, JURISDICTION IN A NUTSHELL-STATE AND
FEDERAL 7,(3d ed. 1973). The meaning of jurisdiction adopted in this article is limited to
determining when particular tangible personal property can be constitutionally subjected to ad
valorem taxation.
9. Technically, there is a difference between exemption from taxation and exclusion
from the tax base through exercise of the classification power. The practical result is, however,
the same and the distinction is not pertinent to this discussion. See H. LEWIS, BASIC LEGAL
PROBLEMS IN THE TAXATION OF PROPERTY (Institute of Government, University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1958).
10. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
11. 285 N.C. at 610, 207 S.E.2d at 737.
12. See text accompanying notes 20-22, 36-41 infra. Professor Beale, in a classic article,
declared that "[t]he power to tax is one of the attributes of sovereignty; and the jurisdiction to
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domiciliary state of the owner of personal property, tangible and intangible,
was said to have exclusive jurisdiction to tax that property without regard to
its actual location, while the state of location of real property had exclusive
jurisdiction to tax that property without regard to the domicile of the owner.
The second part of this dichotomy still holds true. 13 The first has a certain
naive charm and logical symmetry, but it has long been abandoned by the
United States Supreme Court in favor of a more sophisticated approach
grounded on the concept of fundamental fairness embodied in the due
process clause 14 and the prohibition of state interference with the free flow
of interstate commerce. 15 In the absence of clear evidence in the statute of a
contrary intent, then, the preferable view is that the General Assembly
intended to exercise all the power it has. Since the state constitution does not
restrict the taxing power in ways relevant to the subject under con-
sideration, 16 it is necessary to look to the federal constitution for the
exercise the power is coterminous with the bounds of the sovereign's jurisdiction." Beale,
Jurisdiction to Tax, 32 HARV. L. REV. 587, 587 (1919). In 1921, another respected figure urged
that "[t]he fundamental test which should be applied is whether or not the property is situated
within the territorial jurisdiction of the state." Landis, The Commerce Clause as a Restriction
on State Taxation, 20 MICH. L. REV. 50, 80 (1921).
13. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-301 (1972).
14. See text accompanying notes 43-47 infra. See also W. BEAMAN, PAYING TAXES To
OTHER STATES 1.9 (1963); P. HARTMAN, STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE 13-15
(1953); Nash, Situs for Taxation of Tangible and Intangible Personalty, 19 ORE. L. REV. 309,
316 (1940); Powell, Taxation of Things in Transit, 7 VA. L. REV. 167, 261 (1920). In Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), the United States Supreme Court recently emphasized the
importance of this requirement in a personal jurisdiction context in overruling the case of
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). Rather than retain the strict territorial limits to juris-
diction imposed by Pennoyer, the Court held "[t]he standard for determining whether an
exercise of jurisdiction. . . is consistent with the Due Process Clause is the minimum-contacts
standard elucidated in International Shoe." 433 U.S. at 207 (citing International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)).
15. See text accompanying notes 49-79 infra. See also W. BEAMAN, supra note 12, at 1. 10,
14.9-. 11; P. HARTMAN, supra note 14, at 73-79; Nash, supra note 14, at 316; Powell, supra note
14, at 192.
16. N.C. CONsT. art. V, § 2(2), (3) provide that the General Assembly may exercise its
power to define the tax base only by general laws uniformly applicable in every taxing
jurisdiction and may not delegate these powers. These subsections do not address the extent of
the taxing power. Id. § 2(1) provides that the taxing power shall be "exercised in a just and
equitable manner," but there are no cases using this command as the basis for defining the
extent of the power. Id. art. I, § 19 provides that no person may be deprived of "life, liberty, or
property, but by the law of the land" and guarantees to all persons "equal protection of the
laws." These provisions have been held repeatedly to be equivalent to the due process and
equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution. See, e.g., In re Moore, 289 N.C. 95,
221 S.E.2d 307 (1976) ("law of the land" is synonymous with "due process of law"); S.S.
Kresge Co. v. Davis, 277 N.C. 654, 178 S.E.2d 832 (1971) (equal protection principle of
fourteenth amendment now incorporated into Constitution of North Carolina). While decisions
of the United States Supreme Court construing the due process and equal protection clauses are
not controlling with respect to interpretation of N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19, the North Carolina
Supreme Court has generally looked to federal case law in this regard. See Bulova Watch Co. v.
Brand Distrib., Inc., 285 N.C. 467, 206 S.E.2d 141 (1974); Horton v. Gulledge, 277 N.C. 353,
177 S.E.2d 885 (1970).
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dimensions of a state's power to tax tangible personal property and, hence,
for the meaning of the statute.
The courts have generated different analytical approaches to juris-
diction for each of the four general categories of personalty: instrumen-
talities of commerce; intangibles; goods and merchandise; and equipment
and machinery. 17 While North Carolina statutes18 endeavor "to provide the
machinery for the listing, appraisal, and assessment of property and the levy
and collection of taxes on property by counties and municipalities,"' 19 they
offer no guidance for making the preliminary and necessary determination
of jurisdiction to tax specific property. This omission seems well advised.
The application of complex constitutional concepts to the wide variety of
fact situations involved in jurisdictional determinations is more suited to the
judicial than the legislative process.
Although this article focuses on the analytical approach taken by the
courts with respect to state jurisdiction to tax goods and merchandise, a
basic understanding of the jurisdictional approaches taken with respect to
two of the other categories of personal property-instrumentalities of
commerce and intangibles-is useful in accurately identifying and under-
standing the separate legal tests applicable to fact patterns involving goods
and merchandise.
The courts have continually modified their approach in determining the
jurisdiction of a state to impose a property tax on ships, planes, railroad cars
and other instrumentalities of commerce. These vessels are constantly mov-
ing from place to place and are not in fact sufficiently settled to be
considered as permanently located anywhere. Relying on an approach long
since abandoned, the early cases in this area ignored constitutional issues
and relied on the maxim of mobilia sequunturpersonam to establish a more
or less fictional tax situs for instrumentalities of commerce. 20 This juris-
dictional fiction empowered the owner's domicile or the corporation's state
of charter to tax property that had no actual situs elsewhere or was incapable
of acquiring such situs. With respect to California's ability to tax New York
17. With respect to machinery and equipment, establishing jurisdiction to tax has gener-
ally paralleled the treatment afforded real property. Although potentially movable, this cate-
gory of personal property is almost always permanently located and likewise satisfies the
requirements of territoriality and makes inapplicable the limitations of the commerce clause in
establishing the state's jurisdiction to tax the property at its permanent situs.
18. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-271 to -395 (1972 & Cum. Supp. 1977) (the Machinery Act).
19. Id. § 105-272 (1972).
20. See Beale, The Situs of Things, 28 YALE L.J. 525, 528 (1919). Situs, according to
Professor Beale, "does not include the mere temporary location of a thing, but refers solely to a
location which has such a degree of permanence that the thing may fairly be described as settled
within the place and as forming a part of the mass of property in that place." Id. at 525.
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ships in port several days for repairs, for example, the United States
Supreme Court articulated the essence of this approach:
We are satisfied that the State of California had no jurisdiction
over these vessels for the purpose of taxation; they were not,
properly, abiding within its limits, so as to become incorporated
with the other personal property of the State; they were there but
temporarily, engaged in lawful trade and commerce, with their
situs at the home port . . . where the owners were liable to be
taxed for the capital invested, and where the taxes had been paid.
21
Where property became sufficiently settled in a place to have acquired
actual situs, the owner's domicile no longer enjoyed the right to tax. 22 The
early cases, 23 then, established two propositions: (1) without situs any
attempt to tax would be beyond the power of the state, and (2) temporary
presence within the borders of the state alone would not establish situs.
The conception of situs that allowed the domiciliary state to tax all
instrumentalities of commerce in the absence of a specifically established
situs elsewhere was abandoned near the turn of the century in favor of a
fourteenth amendment/due process approach.24 Following this constitutional
approach, courts have permitted the taxation of instrumentalities by two or
more states based on a fair apportionment of the commerce carried on within
each state?2 This line of jurisdictional analysis has developed to such an
extent that "the domiciliary State is precluded from imposing an ad valorem
tax on any property to the extent that it could be taxed by another State, not
merely on such property as is subjected to tax elsewhere." 26 The ultimate
question under the modem approach to determining jurisdiction to tax the
means of transport has been clearly stated by the Supreme Court as
"whether the tax in practical operation has relation to opportunities, bene-
fits, or protection conferred or afforded by the taxing State. '27 A property
tax imposed under this approach more closely corresponds to the benefits
actually received than a levy under the fictional situs analysis.
21. Hays v. Pacific Mail S.S. Co., 58 U.S. (17 How.) 596, 599-600 (1855); see Morgan v.
Parham, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 471 (1873); St. Louis v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 423
(1871); North Cent. R.R. v. Jackson, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 262 (1869).
22. Beale, supra note 20, at 528.
23. See cases cited note 21 supra.
24. See Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194 (1905); Old Dominion
S.S. Co. v. Virginia, 198 U.S. 299 (1905); Louisville & Jeffersonville Ferry Co. v. Kentucky,
188 U.S. 385 (1903); Powell, supra note 14, at 249-50.
25. See W. BEAMAN, supra note 14, at 14-12, -13; P. HARTMAN, supra note 14, at 84-95.
Instrumentalities of commerce in interstate transit are not immune from property taxation.
Pullman Co. v. Richardson, 261 U.S. 330, 331 (1923).
26. Central R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 370 U.S. 607, 614 (1962) (emphasis in original).
27. Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169, 174 (1949).
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A somewhat similar approach has been adopted by the courts with
respect to a state's jurisdiction to tax various forms of intangible personal
property. As with instrumentalities of commerce, the owner's domicile was
originally presumed the proper taxing authority via the maxim mobilia
sequunturpersonam.28 This concept also operated to avoid double taxation.
Later, the Supreme Court abandoned this fiction and recognized the special
nature of intangible property rights:
29
Such rights are but relationships between persons, natural or
corporate, which the law recognizes by attaching to them certain
sanctions enforceable in courts. The power of government over
them and the protection which it gives them cannot be exerted
through control of a physical thing. They can be made effective
only through control over and protection afforded to those persons
whose relationships are the origin of the rights.30
Eventually the Supreme Court adopted a fourteenth amendment analysis that
permitted more than one state to levy a tax on intangible property that could
not be reduced to a single location. 31 In order to satisfy the due process
requirements that establish the power of each state to tax intangible person-
alty it must be determined "whether the taxing power exerted by the state
bears fiscal relation to protection, opportunities and benefits given by the
state. The simple but controlling question is whether the state has given
anything for which it can ask return. "32 As with instrumentalities of
commerce, then, the judicial approaches to determining whether a state has
the power to tax intangible personal property have evolved from a beginning
reliance on general principles of territoriality to an application of basic
constitutional concepts.
Contrary to the specialized lines of jurisdictional analysis adopted with
respect to instrumentalities of commerce and intangibles, the approach for
determining jurisdiction to tax goods and merchandise has centered around
the commerce clause. The Supreme Court articulated the rather formal
distinction between the constitutional analysis applicable to merchandise
and that applicable to instrumentalities of commerce in Braniff Airways,
Inc. v. Nebraska State Board of Equalization & Assessment:33
While the question of whether a commodity en route to market is
sufficiently settled in a state for purpose of subjection to a property
28. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
29. See P. HARTMAN, supra note 14, at 80.
30. Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 365-66 (1939).
31. See State Tax Comm'n v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174 (1942); Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S.
357 (1939).
32. Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435,444 (1940); see, e.g., Rhode Island Hosp.
Trust Co. v. Doughton, 270 U.S. 69 (1926).
33. 347 U.S. 590 (1954).
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tax has been determined by this Court as a Commerce Clause
question, the bare question whether an instrumentality of
commerce has tax situs in a state for the purpose of subjection to a
property tax is one of due process.
3 4
Judicial confusion and misunderstanding of key concepts have historic-
ally made it difficult to arrive at a confident determination of jurisdiction to
tax different types of merchandise. While this article attempts to make some
order out of chaos, the advice of Justice Frankfurter should always be kept
in mind:
The power of the Sthtes to tax and the limitations upon that
power imposed by the Commerce Clause have necessitated a long,
continuous process of judicial adjustment ....
The history of this problem is spread over hundreds of
volumes of our Reports. To attempt to harmonize all that has been
said in the past would neither clarify what has gone before nor
guide the future. Suffice it to say that especially in this field
opinions must be read in the setting of the particular cases and as
the product of preoccupations with their special facts.
35
With this warning and the emphasis on the commerce clause in mind,
the following outline and analysis are suggested as a checklist for determin-
ing whether or not the imposition of the North Carolina ad valorem tax on
goods and merchandise in the state will be upheld:
(1) Do the goods and merchandise have sufficient contacts with the
state to give the sovereign the fundamental power to levy a tax without
violating principles of situs or substantive due process?
(2) If so, are the commodities outside interstate commerce and there-
fore subject to the property tax? To answer this question in the affirmative it
must be- ascertained that the facts of a given case fall within one of the
following patterns:
(a) Before transit begins: Do operations affecting the goods
or merchandise represent sufficiently local and preparatory acts so
as not to constitute interstate commerce?
(b) Interruption of transit: Do the reasons for the break in
transit-business or safety-constitute a stoppage sufficient to re-
move the goods from interstate commerce?
(c) Termination of transit: Do the surrounding circumstances
indicate that interstate transit is completed so that the goods and
merchandise are no longer immune from tax?
34. Id. at 598-99 (footnotes omitted).
35. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 251-52 (1946); see Page, Jurisdiction to Tax Tangible
Movables, 1945 Wis. L. REV. 125, 154-55.
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Both the due process and the commerce clause phases of the test must be
answered affirmatively if North Carolina is to legally have the power and
authority to levy a tax upon the particular goods or merchandise.
PHASE 1-SITUS AND DUE PROCESS
Although cases involving goods and merchandise rarely address the
initial territorial question of state power, it is clear that the generally
abandoned situs concept provides some limited guidance in establishing the
Phase 1 requirement fundamental to jurisdiction. 36 Situs "refers solely to a
location which has such a degree of permanence that the thing may fairly be
described as settled within the place and as forming a part of the mass of
property in that place." 37 SitUs to tax exists if it can be established that
certain goods or merchandise are within the state for a period of time under
circumstances that would enable a reasonable person to consider them more
or less permanently settled. A particular item only temporarily in the state
does not satisfy this loosely described territorial requirement of
jurisdiction.
38
The practical difficulty of finding actual situs stems from a combina-
tion of the fictional nature of the concept and the inability of the courts to
announce relatively clear criteria. Nevertheless, a basic understanding of
situs should promote greater confidence in anyone able to satisfy the Court's
earlier criteria in that a finding of actual situs will positively satisfy the
Phase 1 requirement without requiring consideration of the more recent due
process test. This method can be utilized, despite the abandonment of the
situs concept by the courts, because it is difficult to envision a set of facts in
which items of personalty could be more or less permanently in the state
without at least enjoying the minimum benefits and protections of the
sovereign necessary to satisfy the due process requirements 39 so essential to
the state's power to tax.
It is important, however, to remain keenly aware of the inherent
limitations in a situs-oriented approach to analyzing Phase 1 of the test. An
inability to establish a sufficiently permanent relationship between the
sovereign and various goods is not dispositive of the state's ability to impose
a property tax. As a practical matter, goods or merchandise temporarily in
36. In spite of the fact "that the requirement of situs was definitely made part of the
mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment," it is not unusual for courts to use the term "situs"
when they actually mean due process. Powell, supra note 14, at 249. Nevertheless, "it seems
reasonable to treat all talk of situs as related to the present-day conception of due process of
law." Id. at 250.
37. Beale, supra note 20, at 525.
38. See id.
39. See text accompanying notes 42-48 infra.
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the state may enjoy sufficient benefits to be taxable under a due process
approach without being sufficiently "settled" to form a "part of the mass of
property" taxable under the more stringent situs approach. 4 The concepts
of situs and due process involve somewhat different points of emphasis and
the courts have generally relied on one or the other as a means of answering
this fundamental question of territoriality.41 Flexibility and care are essential
in this area, however, for it has traditionally involved the application of
vaguely defined criteria to a wide variety of facts. In the event the situs
requirement cannot be satisfied, the cautious and thoughtful tax attorney or
assessor will always employ a due process test in answering this preliminary
jurisdictional issue.
While the general concept of situs once formed the first basic territorial
requirement for a state's jurisdiction to tax, today that requirement is applied
as a mandate of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. It is
settled that a state may not exert dominion over property beyond its borders
without offending notions of due process as well as essential concepts of
governmental and sovereign power. The Supreme Court has consistently
declared that "no state may tax anything not within her jurisdiction without
violating the Fourteenth Amendment" '42 and that a "state may not tax real
property or tangible personal property lying outside her borders.' 43 Thus,
the threshold question is whether a particular commodity has sufficient
contacts within the state to give the sovereign the essential power to tax.
The Supreme Court's clearest expression of the evolution from a situs
to a due process analysis came in the case of Wisconsin v. .C. Penney Co.,'
in which the Court merged earlier tests by declaring that" '[tiaxable event,'
'jurisdiction to tax,' 'business situs,' 'extraterritoriality,' are all compendi-
ous ways of implying the impotence of state power because state power has
nothing on which to operate." 45 Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court,
then discussed the basic Phase 1 inquiry regarding state power or juris-
diction to tax:
40. See Beale, supra note 20, at 525.
41. In cases involving goods and merchandise, the courts often begin their jurisdictional
analysis with the commerce clause limitations and assume that the preliminary due process
requirements have been satisfied. These requirements are clearly an element of jurisdiction,
however, and must be addressed in determining whether particular tangible personal property is
subject to taxation. Consequently, the analysis in this section applies the basic concept of situs
to tangible personalty and borrows applicable due process requirements from cases involving
other forms of personal property.
42. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204, 210 (1930).
43. A & P Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412, 424 (1937).
44. 311 U.S. 435 (1940).
45. Id. at 444.
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That test is whether property was taken without due process of
law, or . . . whether the taxing power exerted by the state bears
fiscal relation to protection, opportunities and benefits given by the
state. The simple but controlling question is whether the state has
given anything for which it can ask return.
46
Like the situs-oriented analysis, the due process approach presents a
rather broadly drawn test that lacks helpful guidelines. Again, tax attorneys
and assessors should concentrate on each fact situation in looking for
relevant state contacts with the particular goods or merchandise. It is
extremely important in making an accurate analysis to realize that satisfac-
tion of the due process requirements is not keyed as strongly to the concept
of permanence as is situs. The emphasis has generally been on the qualita-
tive significance of the contact with the state, rather than the duration of that
contact. Perhaps a better feel for this substantive due process analysis and
some guide for discretion can be drawn from Justice Brown's opinion in
Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky:
47
The power of taxation, indispensable to the existence of every
civilized government, is exercised upon the assumption of an
equivalent rendered to the taxpayer in the protection of his person
and property, . . . or in the creation and maintenance of public
conveniences in which he shares, such, for instance, as roads,
bridges, [and] sidewalks. . . . If the taxing power be in no posi-
tion to render these services, or otherwise to benefit the person or
property taxed . . . the taxation of such property . . . partakes
rather of the nature of an extortion than a tax, and has been
repeatedly held by this court to be beyond the power of the legisla-
ture, and a taking of property without due process of law.
48
While many of the cases that expressly consider these minimum substantive
due process requirements involve the taxation of intangible property, the
preliminary satisfaction of these requirements is equally necessary with
regard to the taxation of goods and merchandise.
The apparent practical effect of such a broad due process analysis is to
provide Phase 1 authority and jurisdiction to tax nearly all goods and
merchandise within the physical borders of North Carolina. To the extent
that various law enforcement practices join to ensure safe storage or pas-
sage, all goods in North Carolina are "protected" by the state. By providing
46. Id. The Court ultimately decided that the privilege of carrying on a business under the
protection of Wisconsin law was sufficient to satisfy Justice Frankfurter's jurisdictional test
and support the tax. Id. at 446.
47. 199 U.S. 194 (1905).
48. Id. at 202.
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the roads and bridges over which merchandise is transported, North Caro-
lina is arguably providing "something for which it can ask a return."
Assessors and consulting attorneys should, nevertheless, carefully evaluate
the facts and circumstances of each situation in light of the broad standards
promulgated by the courts.
The previous analysis provides a general guide for making the prelimi-
nary territorial determination of whether the state has sufficient jurisdiction
to tax particular goods and merchandise. If for some reason Phase 1 cannot
be resolved in the affirmative, the state will have absolutely no authority to
tax the items of personalty and Phase 2 will be irrelevant. The commerce
clause variables considered in Phase 2 are best thought of as limiting factors
that become a proper matter for consideration only after original jurisdiction
to tax based on Phase 1 has clearly attached. If jurisdiction to tax goods or
merchandise is found under the due process test of Phase 1, however, one
must address the commerce clause limits imposed by Phase 2.
PHASE 2-THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
The United States Constitution provides that "[t]he Congress shall
have Power. . .[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." 4 9 In 1872, the Supreme
Court refused to allow Pennsylvania to levy a property tax on freight
transported interstate by rail or water because the tax was regarded as a
"regulation" of commerce among the states.50 In so holding the Court
reasoned that since freight transportation is part of commerce,51 a tax on the
interstate transportation of such freight would be a regulation of commerce
among the states.52 But,
whenever the subjects over which a power to regulate commerce is
asserted are in their nature national, or admit of one uniform
system or plan of regulation, they may justly be said to be of such
nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress. Surely trans-
portation of passengers or merchandise through a State, or from
one State to another, is of this nature.
53
Thus, a state tax on freight moving into or out of the state interferes with this
exclusive congressional power and violates the commerce clause. This
significant precedent has been uniformly followed and the states have
49. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
50. Reading R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1873) (case of the State Freight
Tax).
51. Id. at 275.
52. Id. at 275-76.
53. Id. at 279-80 (footnote omitted).
19781
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
consistently been denied the power to tax goods and merchandise in
transit.
5 4
In determining whether a particular item of personalty is in interstate
commerce and exempt from tax, the Court has generally relied on the
concepts of time and motion. At three different points, goods and merchan-
dise that have satisfied the preliminary Phase 1 substantive due process test
are no longer exempted from the property tax by operation of the commerce
clause: (1) before transit begins; (2) during an interruption of transit; and (3)
following a termination of transit. At all other times the freight is presumed
to be in interstate comme ce and protected from the impediments of state
taxation. To determine whether specific goods are in interstate commerce,
one should select the basic approach outlined below that provides the closest
analog to the facts at hand. Once within a specific pattern, the legal analysis
should be applied that corresponds with that area to resolve whether the
goods and merchandise are constitutionally beyond the state's ultimate
jurisdiction or power to tax.
A. Before Transit Begins
In recognizing that goods and merchandise in interstate commerce
cannot be taxed, the Supreme Court has necessarily acknowledged that such
property is subject to the power of the state of origin prior to the final
movement out of that state. In Coe v. Errol,55 the Supreme Court held that
logs cut in New Hampshire and detained either in the river or along the bank
until higher water would permit shipment downstream were subject to
taxation in New Hampshire. The Court's opinion emphasized:
There must be a point of time when [goods destined for other
states] cease to be governed exclusively by the domestic law and
begin to be governed and protected by the national law of commer-
cial regulation, and that moment seems to us to be a legitimate one
for this purpose, in which they commence their final movement for
transportation from the State of their origin to that of their destina-
tion. 6
54. Instrumentalities of commerce do not enjoy the same commerce clause immunity, but
are instead required to pay taxes on an apportioned basis. See text accompanying note 25
supra.
55. 116 U.S. 517 (1886). For an excellent and detailed discussion of the commerce clause
limitations in a variety of areas concerning state taxation, see P. HARTMAN, supra note 14.
56. 116 U.S. at 525; see Walton v. Westwood, 73 III. 125 (1874); Ayer & Lord Tie Co. v.
Keown, 122 Ky. 580, 93 S.W. 588 (1906); Maurer v. Cliff, 94 Mich. 194, 53 N.W. 1055 (1892);
State v. Burlington Lumber Co., 118 Minn. 329, 136 N.W. 1033 (1912); State v. Taber Lumber
Co., 101 Minn. 186, 112 N.W. 214 (1907); Winkley v. Newton, 67 N.H. 80, 36 A. 610 (1892);
State v. Rose, 67 N.J.L. 86, 50 A. 364 (1901). But see Blount v. Munroe, 60 Ga. 61 (1878);
Standard Oil Co. v. Bachelor, 89 Ind. 1 (1883).
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This case clearly established the basic principle that a mere intention to ship
is not sufficient to terminate established tax situs. 57 The Court recognized
that an owner who plans to export his goods is under no duty to actually do
so, with the result that the merchandise "may be sold or otherwise disposed
of within the State and never put in course of transportation out of the
State.' '58 Thus, an unequivocal action to sever the existing situs relationship
and mark the beginning of the actual journey is necessary to place a product
in interstate commerce and protect it from state taxation.
A somewhat similar problem was presented to the Court in Diamond
Match Co. v. Ontonagon.59 Logs cut in Michigan were put in a stream and
floated to a point within the state to be held until they were shipped out by
rail on demand. In upholding a tax on the logs at that point, the Court
established that motion itself will not determine situs, regarding the move-
ment of logs to another point within the state as merely preparatory to
interstate commerce. This case confirms that certain operations, such as
assembling the goods and merchandise at a depot pending final shipment,
are preparatory and local in character and do not constitute interstate
commerce. Manufacture and processing are also generally regarded as local
in nature.
B. Interruption of Transit
Though questions have been raised regarding goods that have not yet
entered the stream of commerce, most problems regarding property taxation
arise when manufacturing and processing interrupt interstate commerce.
The Supreme Court has consistently held that if interstate transit is inter-
rupted and the items of personalty are halted, they may be taxed. It
nevertheless remains difficult to determine precisely what sort of stoppage
amounts to an interruption. The purpose of the stoppage is generally con-
sidered crucial; 6° if the interstate transit is halted for business reasons of the
owner or to enjoy some independent local advantage, the goods and mer-
chandise are no longer protected by the commerce clause and are subject to
taxation.
Interruptions in transit relating to processing, manufacturing or storage
generally subject the goods to taxation because of the local nature of the
function and the specific advantage to the owner. The case of American
Steel & Wire Co. v. Speed,61 for example, involved products owned by a
57. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U.S. I (1933).
58. 116 U.S. at 528.
59. 188 U.S. 82 (1903).
60. See, e.g., Kelley v. Rhoads, 188 U.S. 1 (1903).
61. 192 U.S. 500 (1904).
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New Jersey corporation that were sent to a warehouse in Tennessee and
found to be within its taxing jurisdiction. It was considered immaterial that
the warehouse was a major distribution point and that a large percentage of
the goods were destined to leave the state in a short time. It was extremely
significant to the Court, however, that the interruption in transit was not
occasioned by the exigencies of interstate travel, but instead by the commer-
cial needs of the owner.
Somewhat similarly, in General Oil Co. v. Crain62 the Court ruled that
Tennessee was allowed to tax oil that had been removed from the cars
bringing it into the state and stored in tanks for later shipment to other states.
In holding that the interstate transit was broken and the oil was liable to
taxation, the Court emphasized:
The company was doing business in the State, and its property was
receiving the protection of the State. . . . It had reached the
destination of its first shipment, and it was held there, not in
necessary delay or accommodation to the means of transportation,
. . . but for the business purposes and profit of the company. 63
The majority stressed the business and profit motives of the company as
overriding the fact that a percentage of the oil had actually been committed
to sale before arriving in Tennessee.
The interruption of transit doctrine continued to develop in Susquehan-
na Coal Co. v. South Amboy ,64 in which coal shipped from Pennsylvania to
a storage dump maintained by the railroad in New Jersey was held taxable in
that state. The coal was either immediately transferred to ships or kept at the
dump until the ships were available. The Court reasoned that taxation of the
coal was justified because:
[T]here was something more than the submission to delay in trans-
portation and the acceptance of its consequences. . . . There was
something more than an incidental interruption of the continuity of
its journey through the state . . . . There was . . . a business
purpose and advantage in the delay which was availed of, and while
it was availed of, the products secured the protection of the state.6 5
These cases clearly demonstrate the Court's focus on the purpose of an
interruption in deciding whether the goods involved have been sufficiently
removed from commerce to be subject to taxation.
In Bacon v. Illinois,66 the Supreme Court extended this doctrine
62. 209 U.S. 211 (1908).
63. Id. at 230-31.
64. 228 U.S. 665 (1913).
65. Id. at 668-69; see, e.g., Burlington Lumber Co. v. Willitts, 118 11. 559, 9 N.E. 254
(1886); Pocomoke Guano Co. v. Biddle, 158 N.C. 178, 73 S.E. 996 (1912).
66. 227 U.S. 504 (1913).
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beyond the simple storage of goods and merchandise. The owner of a
substantial amount of grain contracted with a carrier through bills of lading
to ship it from the West to New York and Philadelphia. The owner,
however, reserved the right to remove the grain at Chicago for inspection,
weighing, cleaning, grading and mixing. Although none of the grain was
sold or intended for sale in Illinois, the Court nevertheless found a break in
the interstate transport and sustained an Illinois ad valorem tax on grain.
Focusing on the benefit to the owner and his control over the commodities,
the Court declared:
[N]either the fact that the grain had come from outside the State
nor the intention of the owner to send it to another State and there
to dispose of it can be deemed controlling when the taxing power of
the State of Illinois is concerned. The property was held . . . in
Chicago for his own purposes and with full power of disposi-
tion. . . . He might sell the grain in Illinois or forward it, as he saw
fit. . . . He had established a local facility in Chicago for his own
benefit and while, through its employment, the grain was there at
rest, there was no reason that it should not be included with his
other property within the State in an assessment for
taxation .... 67
The cases reveal that tax day is an expensive time for goods to be at rest
in any state for a purpose not clearly incidental to their transit. The courts
have generally been willing to find state jurisdiction to tax the goods in
question, even though their stay is temporary and they are destined to move
on.6
8
Conversely, the courts have consistently held that interstate transit is
not interrupted so long as the stop is considered necessary or incidental to
the journey. The case of Kelley v. Rhoads,69 for example, involved a flock
of sheep being driven from Utah to Nebraska through Wyoming. Because
the sheep grazed along the way, the State of Wyoming invoked a statute
designed to tax all livestock brought into the state to graze. The Court ruled
67. Id. at 515-16. State courts have consistently held that interruptions in transit for
manufacturing and processing purposes take the property out of interstate commerce and place
it within the jurisdiction of the state to tax. See, e.g., Southern Kraft Corp. v. Hardin, 205 Ark.
512, 169 S.W.2d 637 (1943); Brown County v. Standard Oil Co., 103 Ind. 302,2 N.E. 758 (1885);
Standard Oil Co. v. Combs, 96 Ind. 196 (1884); Myers v. Baltimore County, 83 Md. 385, 35 A.
144 (1896); Jorgensen-Bennett Mfg. Co. v. Knight, 156 Tenn. 597, 3 S.W.2d 668 (1928). But see
People ex rel. Kursheedt Mfg. Co. v. Feitner, 32 Misc. 84, 66 N.Y.S. 179 (App. Term 1900).
68. In a case remarkably similar to Bacon v. Illinois, however, the North Carolina
Supreme Court utilized a mistaken analysis and therefore exempted goods undergoing a
manufacturing process within the state from taxation without reaching this issue. In re Hanes
Dye & Finishing Co., 285 N.C. 598,207 S.E.2d 729 (1974). The confusing jurisdictional analysis
resorted to by the supreme court in Hanes emphasizes the need for a clear test to determine
jurisdiction to tax tangible personal property. See Note, supra note 5.
69. 188 U.S. 1 (1903).
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the tax violated the commerce clause of the federal constitution because the
grazing was a necessary incident of the flock's journey. It was significant to
the Court that the primary purpose of the trip was transportation.
Similarly, the particular goods or merchandise remain immune from
taxation as long as the stop is occasioned by considerations of safety. In
Champlain Realty Co. v. Brattleboro,70 a case similar to Coe v. Errol,
71
logs cut in Vermont were placed in a stream to be floated to the Connecticut
River and on into New York. Due to the unusually high water in the river,
however, the logs were caught in a boom near the mouth of the tributary and
held until conditions were safe. Vermont levied a tax on the logs, arguing
that under Coe v. Errol the movement had been preparatory and that the
interstate transit of domestic products did not begin until they left the state.
Distinguishing Coe v. Errol on grounds that the delay there was for the
owner's convenience, the Court disallowed the tax72 and declared:
The logs were not detained to be classified, measured, counted or
in any way dealt with by the owner for his benefit, except to save
them from destruction in the course of their journey that but for
natural causes, over which he could exercise no control, would
have been actually continuous.
... If the interruptions are only to promote the safe or
convenient transit, then the continuity of the interstate trip is not
broken. 73
In determining whether interstate transit is interrupted and its protec-
tion lost, tax attorneys and assessors should consider the following factors:
"the intention of the owner, the control he retains to change destination, the
agency by which the transit is effected, the actual continuity of the transpor-
tation, and the occasion or purpose of the interruption. " 74 It must be
realized, however, that these purpose-oriented guidelines for determining
whether commerce has been interrupted do not always accommodate reality.
The purposes are often intermingled and the goods may be halted for both
business and transportation considerations. For example, in Kelley v.
Rhoads,75 involving the sheep being driven through Wyoming, it was
virtually impossible to determine whether the grazing was incidental to the
travel or if the travel was incidental to the grazing. In close cases of this sort,
70. 260 U.S. 366 (1922).
71. 116 U.S. 517 (1885); see text accompanying notes 55-58 supra.
72. 260 U.S. at 377; accord, Hughes Bros. Timber Co. v. Minnesota, 272 U.S. 469 (1926).
The facts were almost identical except the delay was occasioned by ice rather than high waters.
73. 260 U.S. at 373-74, 376; see Connecticut River Lumber Co. v. Columbia, 62 N.H. 286
(1882).
74. 260 U.S. at 377.
75. 188 U.S. 1 (1903); see text accompanying note 69 supra.
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the assessor should resolve the issue by balancing all of the relevant factors
to determine the primary purpose of the journey.
C. Termination of Transit
The final Phase 2 analysis is premised on the fact that goods and
merchandise are no longer immune from taxation at the close of an interstate
journey. Generally speaking, courts have considered the journey ended at
whatever point the goods are offered for sale. In Brown v. Houston ,76 for
example, coal that had been shipped in barges from Pennsylvania down the
Mississippi River to Louisiana was offered for sale while still in the barges.
In upholding the Louisiana ad valorem tax on the coal, the Court decided
that the tax
was imposed after the coal had arrived at its destination and was
put up for sale. The coal had come to its place of rest, for final
disposal or use, and was a commodity in the market of New
Orleans. It might continue in that condition for a year or two years,
or for only a day. It had become a part of the general mass of
property in the State, and as such it was taxed for the current year
77
In the somewhat peculiar case of Pittsburgh & Southern Coal Co. v.
Bates,78 the Court went so far as to find the journey ended even though the
goods had not been offered for sale. Pennsylvania coal shipped in barges
down the Mississippi River was taxed while the barges were in Louisiana
but still a few miles from their destination. After upholding the Louisiana
tax, the Court stated:
The property in this case. . . still belongs to the original owners in
Pennsylvania, but is brought on the navigable waters of the United
States, in boats and barges to Louisiana for the purposes of sale,
and is subject to taxation and sale as any other property of the
citizens of the United States is subject when it becomes incor-
porated into the bulk of the property of the country, unless there be
some special exemption set forth why it should not be thus taxed
and sold, of which there is none here.
79
76. 114 U.S. 622 (1885).
77. Id. at 632-33. Quite similarly, in the case of Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U.S. 1 (1933), a
man purchased eleven head of cattle in the St. Paul, Minnesota, stockyards on the day before
tax day in order eventually to dispose of them for his own profit. Minnesota was allowed to tax
the cattle because they were part of the general mass of livestock locally owned in the state and
subject to the complete dominion of the new owner. Again, the basis for the Court's ruling was
that all transit had ended when the goods were offered for sale in the St. Paul market period.
78. 156 U.S. 577 (1895).
79. Id. at 589.
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So long as the circumstances clearly indicate that the goods are to be finally
located and sold in the taxing state the Court's analysis is little more than a
practical recognition that transit is completed and commerce will not be
disturbed by an accelerated imposition of the property tax. The farther the
goods are from their destination, even though within the taxing state, the
less likely a court will consider the journey ended and subject the goods to
taxation. Consequently, this case establishes no more than that the line of
demarcation between rest and motion is thinner when the items of personalty
are physically located within the taxing jurisdiction and in close proximity to
their final destination.
CONCLUSION
The aim of this article is to provide attorneys and assessors with a two-
pronged test that will enable them to determine when goods and products are
within the state's jurisdiction to tax personal property. While the courts
frequently speak of the due process and commerce clauses as fairly parallel
limitations, it must be realized before applying the two-pronged test that
situations permitting taxation under the one will not always satisfy the other.
Thus, before one can hope for an accurate determination of jurisdiction to
tax each phase of the test must be carefully applied to the specific facts at
issue.
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